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Thailand’s Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street Theatre? 
 
 
Between March and May 2010, nearly 90 people were shot dead and more than 2,100 injured in the most serious 
street fighting in Bangkok for nearly two decades. Television images showed protestors dressed in Red Shirts 
using slingshots to fight soldiers armed with guns and tanks while shops and buildings burnt. 
 
To some observers, these events were a class-based movement of poor people from Thailand’s rural zones 
protesting at an undemocratic government and the lack of inclusion in economic development (e.g. Ungpakorn, 
2010). 
 
But there is also evidence that these protests – while based on a large component of mass protest from poorer 
people - were also carefully managed street theatre. Rather than demonstrating the power of a workers’ 
movement, a variety of factors suggest these conflicts represented clever opportunism of the deposed prime 
minister, Thaksin Shinawatra combined with a variety of symbolic actions by the poorer activists. This 
combination of influences meant that the conflicts in 2010 were not a unified class-based movement, but an 
alliance of actors using sporadic and not always successful tactics to influence Thai politics. 
 
What insights can the 2010 Red Shirt protests of Thailand offer to social movement studies? 
 
Background 
On the face of it, Thailand has good reason to experience political conflict on the grounds of inequality. 
Thailand’s rapid growth as an economic power since the 1970s has not simply occurred through industrialization, 
but also through a long-term and planned centralization of political power. In part, this political concentration 
was a deliberate ploy during the Cold War and Vietnam War to maintain Thailand as a capitalist and pro-West 
state among socialist neighbors (Glassman, 2004). Thailand has experienced military rule for most of its history 
since its establishment as a modern kingdom in 1932. For large parts of the 1970s, many rural areas were strictly 
controlled for national security. Democratic elections (beyond short-term experiments) were held initially only in 
1988, and even then disturbed by military coups in 1991 and 2006. 
 
This concentration of power has also reflected, and indeed perhaps caused by, the growth of Bangkok. Bangkok 
is some 40 times larger than Thailand’s next city of Chiang Mai, and Bangkok’s elites have usually ruled 
Thailand. Most prime ministers since military rule have been retired generals, who have often created political 
parties based on their own personalities and supporters rather than pre-defined political positions of left and right. 
Moreover, Thailand’s aristocratic classes also carry power – although analysts disagree about the individual role 
of the king himself (Handley, 2006). King Bhumiphol Adulyadej has ruled since 1946, and has occupied a 
position of usually unparalleled support from Thai society. He clearly intervened to reduce military power in 
1973 and, less strongly, in 1992. But his visible role since then has been much less. 
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Responses to the military elite, however, have been slight. The Communist Party of Thailand swelled following 
military crackdowns during the 1970s, but quickly weakened in the 1980s. Since the 1980s, many villagers 
protested that they were not included in the immense growth experienced in Bangkok – or against infrastructure 
projects such as dams or power plants if they threatened livelihoods (Forsyth, 2007). But these protests rarely 
slowed down Thailand’s modernization. They also did not lead to an identifiable and long-term left-wing, or pro-
poor, source of political power. During the 1990s, a coalition of rural associations and trade unions emerged 
under the name the Assembly of the Poor, which supported rural protests, and sometimes took to Bangkok’s 
streets (Missingham, 2004). But the Assembly diminished in the late 1990s, perhaps coincidentally with the 
Asian financial crises, and perhaps because of the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra. 
 
The rise of Thaksin 
The immediate origins of the 2010 conflicts can be linked to the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra as prime minister of 
Thailand. 
 
Thaksin broke the mold for various reasons. First, Thaksin did not come from Thailand’s older elites, but instead 
was born in Chiang Mai from a relatively lower class background as a police officer. He then made a fortune on 
the back of a state-allocated monopoly for providing mobile phones and communications in the 1980s-1990s. 
Thaksin was one of the growing number of Thailand’s new business elite, whose success did not depend on 
historic ties to the army or royal family (Baker and Pasuk, 2009). 
 
Second, Thaksin overtly targeted the poorer rural voters of Thailand in order to get electoral support. When he 
turned to politics in the late 1990s, he adopted a populist program, and deliberately asked rural voters what they 
wanted out of government. In addition, Thaksin appealed because he was recognizable as a winner in business, 
and a long-wanted solution to the problems of the financial crisis. He created the popularly-named Thai Rak Thai 
party (‘Thais Love Thais’), which won support from the rural heartlands of northern and northeastern Thailand 
(McCargo and Ukrist, 2005). 
 
Thai Rak Thai was elected in 2001, and Thaksin became Thailand’s first prime minister to remain in power for 
his elected period. He was then re-elected with a larger vote in 2005. Thai Rak Thai  passed some of Thailand’s 
most progressive reforms for poorer citizens, including a universal cheap health care program (the ’30 baht 
scheme’), cheap loans for villagers (the ‘One million baht village loan scheme’), and marketing of products made 
by each locality (‘One tambol one product’). 
 
But Thaksin also attracted criticism for alleged corruption and misuse of power. He was blamed for mishandling 
and inciting the violence in Thailand’s Muslim far south. Thaksin often acted like someone who did not know the 
difference between his own responsibility and that of the country. (Famously, he once claimed to be buying 
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Liverpool Football Club, and then implied that this would be paid for out of Thai public money: observers 
believe this was a public relations trick). 
 
Most controversially, Thaksin fell from grace rapidly when he sold his family business, the Shin Corporation to 
the rival Singapore sovereign wealth fund and avoided paying tax in 2006. A new political organization, the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), arose to challenge Thaksin directly. This organization, led by a 
previous business associate of Thaksin plus a rival politician, organized street protests in Bangkok with 
supporters dressed in yellow shirts – the color used to celebrate the King’s birthday – and consequently became 
known as the ‘Yellow Shirts.’ Declaring that they ‘fight for the King,’ and declaring Thaksin to be a secret 
republican, they urged Thaksin to step down. One Yellow Shirt leader also controversially claimed rural voters 
could not be trusted to vote because they lacked sufficient knowledge and judgment. Thaksin, while denying any 
opposition to the royalty, finally agreed to step down in 2006. But, apparently worried that he might not do so, 
the army intervened in September 2006 and deposed Thaksin in a coup. 
 
The 2006 coup and aftermath 
The army justified the 2006 coup was on the grounds of restoring national security and protecting the monarchy. 
Rumors suggested the coup was particularly backed by the Queen and the head of Thailand’s Privy Council (and 
ex-prime minister), General Prem Tinsulanonda. Many Thai people either saw the coup as a necessary evil, or 
despaired that military tactics should overthrow democracy yet again (Funston, 2009). 
 
The military government ruled for just over one year. It passed a new constitution that increased the regulation of 
prime ministers. It also disbanded the Thai Rak Thai party, and undertook legal action against alleged corruption 
by Thaksin and his wife. But in the general elections of December 2007, the winners were the Palang 
Prachachon (‘People Power’) party – a new force, funded by Thaksin and modeled on Thai Rak Thai. Ironically, 
however, the initial leader of this party, Samak Sundaravej, had a reputation for opposing pro-democracy 
demonstrations during the 1970s. 
 
This new party, however, did not last long. In October 2008, the Yellow Shirts seized Bangkok’s two airports to 
demand that the government step down because it represented the interests of a deposed and discredited prime 
minister. This protest coincided with an official investigation into alleged electoral malpractice by Palang 
Prachachon. When the party was found guilty of buying votes during the 2007 election, it stood down, and was 
disbanded with two other parties. In resulting inter-party negotiations, a new coalition led by the Prachathipat 
(Democrat) party arose took office. This new government was constitutionally legitimate – but it was not based 
on the majority of the electoral vote, and indeed was supported by the Yellow Shirt faction. The government tried 
to restore stability to Thailand, but continued to press charges against Thaksin, eventually finding him guilty of 
misusing his power; sentencing him to two years in jail if he returned to Thailand; and, in early 2010, seizing 1.4 
billion dollars of Thaksin’s assets. 
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But this new government also attracted a new form of political opposition. A parallel group to the PAD emerged, 
calling itself the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), which represented the interests of the 
deposed political parties and of Thaksin. These protestors became known as the Red Shirts, to distinguish them 
from the yellow, and to hint at their relatively poorer support. In March 2009, they invaded a meeting of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and sites in Bangkok, causing embarrassment to the government and a 
strong police response. Then, in 2010, they arrived in their thousands in central Bangkok. 
 
2010: Mobilization or symbolism? 
According to left-wing analysts such as Giles Ungpakorn, the 2010 Red Shirt protests are an unsurprising, and 
indeed inevitable response of Thailand’s poor to decades of being ignored, and by the increasingly unjustified 
attempts of Thailand’s military and royal elite to control Thailand (Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010). These analysts point 
to the ‘unelected’ status of the current government, the existence of a coup to overthrow Thaksin, and the refusal 
to settle problems through new general elections. They also point out how no-one involved in occupying 
Bangkok’s airports in 2008 has been prosecuted, despite the negative impact on Thailand’s reputation and 
thousands of businesses. 
 
Moreover, these analysts claim that the Red Shirts protests were funded by villages and community organizations 
in rural Thailand, and then supported in Bangkok by the urban working classes who provided food and money. 
The historic organizational structure of the Assembly of the Poor provided a means to bring rural protestors 
together, and take them to Bangkok. These analyses portray the Red Shirts as a locally governed, poor-people’s 
movement interested in social justice. 
 
Other evidence, however, suggests that Thaksin or his supporters seized opportunistically on this longer-term 
disaffection in order to distil a crisis in 2010. Unsubstantiated claims say that representatives of the Pheua Thai 
(‘For Thais’) party – the pro-Thaksin party that has succeeded the now defunct Palang Prachachon – offered 
money to villagers in the northeast to attend rallies in Bangkok.1 They also offered large payments in the event of 
death and the cancellation of village debts if the new party were elected. Political activism in Thailand of course 
is full of such precedents, and indeed Thaksin was claimed to fund the Assembly of the Poor during the 1990s 
because it helped destabilize the then government (Baker and Pasuk, 2009). It would be unfair to suggest that 
Thaksin paid all protestors; or that protestors were Thaksin’s ‘stooges.’ But the role of Thaksin seems integral to 
form and purpose of these protests in 2010, with the explicit intention of calling new elections after the deposal 
of Thaksin and the legal and financial actions against him. 
 
There are also other uncertainties. Newspaper reports claim that the Red Shirts contained some men (sometimes 
dressed in black) who carried automatic weapons and who shot at the police and the army – although Red Shirt 
leaders deny these men existed. Were these men fictional inventions of the government in order to justify the 
later crackdown? Or were they agent provocateurs among the Red Shirts who sought to escalate the violence? 
Certainly, some eight government soldiers were killed by gunshots during the protests. Similarly, some acts of 
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violence inside Bangkok – such as grenade explosions outside army buildings – were also described as evidence 
for both terrorism and government manipulation by both sides. 
 
Also, were there different components among the Red Shirts that eventually became splits in the movement? 
Two weeks before the eventual crackdown, newspapers reported that the protestors and the government had 
reached an apparent truce by calling for general elections later in 2010. This apparent agreement was then 
reportedly rejected by the Red Shirt leaders. Did the Red Shirts refuse to trust the government? Or was it because 
the Red Shirt commanders hoped that the fastest response would come from forcing a confrontation in front of 
the world’s cameras? 
 
The protests of 2010, moreover, were full of imagery and symbolism: the vivid colors of the red-shirted 
protestors; the prominence of many women among them, often holding young children aloft in front of barricades 
and cameras. Many Red Shirts protestors were happy to be filmed using slingshots against the armed soldiers 
(despite the claims many protestors had guns). Was this a form of street theatre to command attention? Indeed, 
the protests began by Red Shirt protestors donating their own blood, and then pouring it, symbolically, under the 
gates of parliament house. All of these acts show that the Red Shirts were happy to be portrayed as powerless 
peasants. 
 
But despite the violence facing the Red Shirt protestors, one final question is who would benefit most from this 
conflict? The likely winners of a general election would be the Pheau Thai party – the latest manifestation of 
Thaksin’s political representatives. This party adopts an overtly pro-Thaksin stance, yet is also led by previous 
prime-minister, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. As with the leader of the previous People Power Party, this man 
has often been characterized as disinterested in pro-poor political reform, and indeed has a reputation for 
enhancing his own business interests while in office despite costs to communities and environment (Fahn, 2003). 
 
Making sense of 2010 
It seems hard to escape the conclusion that the Red Shirt protests of 2010 were a calculated coalition between 
two broad sets of interests. On one hand were the lower and middle-income peasantries of Thailand’s north and 
northeast who believe – with some justification – that development in Thailand is avoiding them. On the other 
hand were Thaksin Shinawatra and his supporters who wish to oppose the current regime, unfreeze his assets, 
and even possibly allow Thaksin to return to power. 
 
In this sense, it seems both sides are using each other – the peasants to gain funding and political visibility – and 
Thaksin to mobilize people to destabilize the government. After all, this is a similar situation when Thai Rak Thai 
was elected in the early 2000s. Thaksin mobilized poorer voters to allow him to gain power. We should not be 
surprised if voters support him if he also provides them with benefits (Walker, 2008). 
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Moreover, the conflicts in Thailand also demonstrate different strategies of political mobilization and symbolism. 
Thaksin’s electoral success was based on him offering direct benefits to Thailand’s majority voters from the rural 
lower classes. The Yellow Shirts cannot outnumber the Red Shirts, but they adopt the symbolism of the King to 
claim authority. Ironically, this strategy might have backfired because it might have encouraged the King not to 
risk intervening against the Red Shirt protests because his name was already adopted by the Yellows. If the Red 
Shirts had refused to respond to the King then his authority would be severely damaged. 
 
Meanwhile, the Red Shirts relied on the symbols of sacrifice, spilled blood, mothers and children, and 
powerlessness that have been used in various ways by similar protests since the 1990s. These different 
symbolisms add power to the Yellow Shirts (who cannot rely on the sheer number of votes) and to the Red Shirts 
(who might be numerically strong, but face opposition from the entrenched interests of the army and upper 
classes). 
 
But which groups benefited most from the protests? At the moment, it seems the current government has lost 
prestige internationally, but it is still in power, and has not announced plans for a general election. Indeed, the 
suppression of the Red Shirts seems to have won support from many people in Bangkok and Thailand who have 
sought an end to the violence, and who despised the lawbreaking of the Red Shirts. 
 
Thaksin and his supporters seem to have lost for the time being. The attempt to destabilize the government has 
failed. But Thaksin’s funds can still – at present – support further general elections.  
 
The poorer protestors, however, are in a different position. There is still no political party with an obvious agenda 
for addressing the interests of poorer rural areas. The violence and burning of Thailand’s largest shopping mall, 
Central World, have also weakened their legitimacy. Thailand has seen many protests by militant activists from 
rural areas since the 1990s, but apart from Thai Rak Thai’s policies of the early 2000s, few governments have 
adopted an overt and comprehensive ‘pro-poor’ policy position. Indeed, is it possible that the Red Shirt protestors 
– the ones facing the bullets in central Bangkok – were sent there by elites in order to swap one self-interested 
regime for another? 
 
The answer – so far – seems to be that enough Red Shirt protestors were willing to risk that possibility in order to 
maximize their own interests. It seems entirely rational for citizens who feel marginalized from Bangkok’s 
politics to support a political figure such as Thaksin who has provided them leadership and benefits in the past. 
The protests also gave international attention to inequality in Thailand, and the perceived lack of justice in the 
political system. In time, such publicity and public show of strength might pay greater dividends. 
 
But despite these genuine concerns about inequality in Thailand, the immediate causes of the Red Shirt protests – 
as they occurred in 2010 – seem to lie elsewhere. Much as many would like to see the Red Shirt protests of 2010 
as a mass mobilization based of poorer classes seeking to overthrow an entrenched elite, evidence suggests the 
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purpose and formation of events reflected a series of planned and opportunistic actions by a combination of 
different actors. These different actors were, firstly, the deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who 
brought his financial power and personal desire for retribution to the conflict; and, secondly, many poorer 
activists, who – with varying levels of militancy – wanted to exploit the opportunity posed by Thaksin’s 
dilemma and probable funding to use his case to force Thailand’s elites to take the lower classes more seriously. 
In turn, these actions triggered additional symbolic tactics of calling on most Thai people’s loyalty to the King; 
portraying the Red Shirts as lawless; and of the Red Shirts themselves presenting their members as unarmed 
victims. Despite the appearance of the Red Shirts as a mass labor movement, the main victor of this protest 
would always have been Thaksin Shinawatra, one of Thailand’s greatest capitalists. 
 
The events of 2010, however, will of course not be the end of the story. When general elections come again, we 
can expect to see political parties seeking to court rural votes. Some parties will represent old military elites, and 
others will be funded by new business leaders. It is unclear whether Thaksin will still be allowed to fund electoral 
parties. The ability to call on the symbolism of royalty is also fading. 
 
Yet, perhaps the clearest lessons of the Thai conflicts of 2010 are that the entrenched Bangkok elites are opposed 
by an alliance of a new business elite and lower classes – but that these allies are not always working for each 
other. Moreover, in the short term at least, the blunt force of numbers of votes and protestors can be withheld by 
a more symbolic force of how different actors portray themselves and appeal to what is considered legitimate in 
Thai society. This tactic has been used most prominently by the weaker voices – the electorally smaller Yellow 
shirts, who call upon tradition and the monarchy – and the still-unsuccessful Red Shirts, who have evoked 
images of victimhood and poverty. These symbolic acts are effective tools for social activists when fighting from 
a weaker position. 
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